Economics & Crime Theory

In reading this story in the New York Times about the conclusions reached by implementing aspects of game theory in crime reduction, we see the unfortunate consequences of assuming criminals—especially professional criminals—are somehow going to quit being a criminal if the odds of getting caught are impacted by increasing law enforcement focus on specific criminals.

Experience would indicate that the opposite is true. There is perhaps no more law enforcement focus on criminals than within prisons, yet prisoners have historically been able to continue their criminal activity and in addition, get, almost, anything they want inside prisons, even within super-max and death rows.

An excerpt.

“One way to make apprehension and punishment more likely is to spend substantially more money on law enforcement. In a time of chronic budget shortfalls, however, that won’t happen.

“But Mr. Kleiman suggests that smarter enforcement strategies can make existing budgets go further. The important step, he says, is to view enforcement as a dynamic game in which strategically chosen deterrence policies become self-reinforcing. If offense rates fall enough, a tipping point is reached. And once that happens, even modest enforcement resources can hold offenders in check.

“Consider violent crimes committed by drug gangs. In many cities, such gangs are too numerous for police to watch them all closely. Knowing that they are unlikely to be caught and punished, members can violate the law with impunity. In such situations, Mr. Kleiman argues, the police can gain considerable leverage just by publicizing an enforcement priority list.

“It is an ingenious idea that borrows from game theory and the economics of signaling behavior.

“To see how it works, suppose that all drug violence in a city is committed by members of one of six hypothetical gangs — the Reds, Whites, Blues, Browns, Blacks and Greens — and that the authorities have enough staffing to arrest and prosecute offenders in only one gang at any one time. Mr. Kleiman proposes that the police publicly announce that their first priority henceforth will be offenders in one specific gang — say, the Reds (perhaps because its members committed the most serious crimes in the past).

“This simple step quickly persuades members of that gang that further offenses will result in swift and sure punishment. And that is enough to deter them.

“With the Reds out of action, the police can shift their focus to the Whites. They, too, quickly learn that violent offenses result in swift and certain punishment. So they quiet down as well, freeing the police to focus on the Blues, and so on.”